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Abstract 
 
The ratification crisis of the European Constitution is accompanied 
by an increased enlargement fatigue, prompting a revision of the 
EU’s foreign policy choices. The paper shows that the development 
of the EU’s relations with its neighbours over the past 15 years has 
facilitated this process. Whereas enlargement policy has long been 
the  Union’s  most  efficient  foreign  policy  tool,  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is about to assume this position by in-
corporating central enlargement policy elements. Although the in-
centives offered by the  ENP are of particular interest to eastern 
partners, development perspectives for the Mediterranean have also 
been enhanced. 
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1.  Introduction: The Possible Function of Crises 
 
The perspective of a European Constitution initially seemed to fulfil 
the dreams of some of the founding-fathers of the European integra-
tion project. The EU would finally be able to act more coherently 
and united than ever before, endowed with a legal personality that 
so far was only attributed to the European Communities. The failed 
French and Dutch referenda on the Constitution in May and June 
2005, however, have left little of the enthusiasm and optimism pre-
sent during the European Convention. Instead, the EU now faces 
one of its most severe crises, hardly to be resolved easily as the pro-
longation of the “reflection period” up to 2008 suggests. The cur-
rent crisis was less caused by the constitutional project itself – most 
commentators agree that it is not the philosopher’s stone but none-
theless an important step forward – but mainly by a general lack of 
information and more or less concrete fears and uncertain perspec-
tives.
1 A look back at European integration history, however, also 
teaches that crises have frequently generated new momentum for 
further development (Kühnhardt 2006: 12f), because the EU as of-
ten somewhat inert actor seems to have a tendency to be in need of 
challenges or even crises in order to come up with new approaches. 
Accordingly, crises can indeed function as catalysts for the further 
elaboration  of  the  European  integration  project  and  its  particular 
policies. 
 
 
2.  Consequences of the Current Crisis 
 
The current crisis implies particular problems for the internal devel-
opment and functioning of the EU, because long-awaited reforms 
have been postponed. Already the Amsterdam Treaty generated so-
called “left-overs” of very central nature, because the Treaty failed 
to readjust the voting-powers in the Council, to agree on a workable 
size of the Commission after enlargement and on the scope of quali-
fied majority voting. Solutions to these three aspects were generally 
deemed necessary to keep the Union working after the anticipated 
enlargement.  These  “left-overs”  could  not  be  resolved  with  the 
                                                 
1 See Flash Eurobarometer 171, 2005 (for France) and Flash Eurobarometer 172, 
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Treaty of Nice either. Now that the Constitution offers – at least 
partially – a solution, the ratification crisis has thwarted hopes for 
fast  remedy.  This  situation  makes  the  EU  re-focus  on  itself  and 
thereby causes the EU to minimise any additional negative poten-
tials. The Union therefore consolidates and further develops given 
policies in non-sensitive areas to assure itself and its citizens of the 
Union’s continuing capacities. On the other hand, it is forced to ex-
clude sensitive aspects in its policies as far as possible and therefore 
needs to review critical policies. 
 
In European publics’ perceptions, the Union’s enlargement policy is 
one of the prominent critical policies, with opposition constantly in-
creasing and support declining.
2 Even before the ratification crisis, a 
generally noticeable enlargement fatigue has already pushed many 
European governments to increasingly respond to public demands 
and to be much more reluctant in this regard without, however, to-
tally committing themselves: France, for example, did not only an-
nounce to submit future enlargements to national referenda, the loi 
constitutionnelle  of  1  March  2005  even  added  this  clause  to  the 
French Constitution.
3 The orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004/05 
did not – despite clearly articulated membership aspirations – gen-
erate a positive response on behalf of the EU since many govern-
ments seem to regard the current candidates and the Western Balkan 
states as the only ones to be given a membership perspective at the 
moment. There exists an evident hesitation or even halt to admit 
new candidates.
4 Another indication for the more and more spread-
ing enlargement fatigue is the pronunciation of more or less vague 
concepts  that  are  mainly  perceived  as  obstacles  on  the  way  to 
Europe by candidates or aspirants. Last year’s call to specify the 
concept of “absorption capacity” – also in geographical terms – dis-
                                                 
2 See Eurobarometer 65. First Results, 2006: 26ff. 
3 Art.  88-5:  „Tout  projet  de  loi  autorisant  la  ratification  d'un  traité  relatif  à 
l'adhésion d'un Etat à l'Union européenne et aux Communautés européennes est 
soumis au référendum par le Président de la République.“ 
4 Cf. for example the German position: The Merkel government agreed to pursue 
negotiations with the current candidates but is decidedly opposed to any new ad-
missions of candidates at present. 12  European Political Economy Review  
   
plays reluctance to move forward on the way to an ever larger Un-
ion.
5 
 
If it comes to  the European Neighbourhood Policy, it is not without 
reason that the initially used term “wider Europe” has been replaced 
by “European neighbourhood” in order to prevent people thinking 
of the ENP as pre-enlargement strategy (Stetter 2005: 1). When it 
comes to recognising the “European aspirations” of particular coun-
tries, the rhetoric used in Action Plans hints in the same direction. 
The wording leaves enough room for interpretation because it does 
not clearly answer “whether the aspirations refer to EU membership 
or European values in the metaphysical sense.”
6 
 
Since the accession perspective, on the other hand, is generally re-
garded as being the number one incentive for reform and stability in 
the respective countries and therefore one of the Union’s most effi-
cient foreign policy tools, the EU is eager to transfer the assets of 
this policy for the formulation of relations with its neighbours into 
another policy, i.e. to create a true alternative to enlargement. 
 
Since the EU prefers to use existing policies rather than to create to-
tally new ones, the strategy applied towards neighbours tries to con-
solidate existing mechanisms without taking new risks. The newly 
created ENP therefore combines two elements: It excludes enlarge-
ment for the time being (thereby responding to European publics’ 
demands) and it enhances the incentives for partners (thereby con-
solidating existing neighbourhood policies and responding to part-
ners’ demands). 
 
 
3.  Responding  to  European  Demands  –  The  Creation  of  a 
“Ring of Friends” 
 
                                                 
5 This has been reaffirmed in the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels Euro-
pean Council, 14/15 December 2006 (16879/06): 2, by underlining that enlarge-
ment depends on “the EU’s capacity to integrate new members”. Currently, the 
Polish government, pushing for further eastern enlargement, is quite alone with 
its position. 
6  “EU  gives  glimmer  of  enlargement  hope  for  South  Caucasus  states”, 
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By excluding enlargement for the time being for ENP-partners, the 
EU does in fact create an area of privileged relationships around its 
borders. Although the designation of the neighbourhood as it is to-
day  has  not  necessarily  been  intended  from  the  very  beginning 
(Stetter 2005: 4), the evolution of the EU’s relations with eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean over the past fifteen years has cre-
ated certain path dependencies that have facilitated the finalisation 
of the “ring of friends”. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe has paid particular 
attention to its neighbours. As it formed itself to become the Euro-
pean Union, it soon created mechanisms to support and stabilise the 
countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The EU soon offered an ac-
cession perspective to these and to the Baltic States. In addition, it 
also  established  special  relations  to  the  newly  formed  Common-
wealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS),  inaugurated  to  minimise  the 
further drifting apart of former Soviet republics. With its Technical 
Assistance to the CIS (TACIS), the EU created a special instrument 
to assist the newly created states. Even though not having been part 
of the Soviet Union, TACIS also provided assistance to Mongolia. 
 
With the Eastern enlargement of the EU approaching, Mediterra-
nean EU-members voiced the demand to also enhance relations to 
southern  and  eastern  Mediterranean  countries  by  developing  a 
unique  European  policy  for  the  region.  After  all,  Southern  EU-
members were much more closely linked to most of these countries 
than to countries of East Europe or Central Asia. Accordingly, the 
Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership,  launched  in  Barcelona  in  1995, 
was perceived as some sort of geographic compensation (Chevène-
ment 1996: 49) for the EU’s prospective eastern enlargement. All 
Mediterranean countries – with the exception of the Western Bal-
kans  and  Libya  –  were  founding  members  of  the  EMP.  Jordan, 
without direct access to the Mediterranean, was also included from 
the very beginning. Libya followed in 1999 as associated member. 
At the end of 1995, the EU had consequently established special, 
albeit different foreign policy approaches to govern relations in its 
neighbourhood, a neighbourhood still stretching far into Asia. In the 
meantime, the geographic spaces between these neighbours and the 
EU  had  been  reduced  as  well.  Finland,  Austria  and  Sweden  had 
joined the EU in January 1995, which meant that all western Euro-14  European Political Economy Review  
   
pean countries – with the exception of Switzerland, Norway and the 
European micro-states – were now members in the EU or in NATO 
– most of them even in both. This facilitated the identification of 
distinct groups of countries in the region: Besides the EU and west-
ern  European  countries  a  large  group  of  future  EU-members  be-
came identifiable – including the not yet appeased countries of the 
Balkans – as well as the CIS-countries to the east and the Mediter-
ranean Partner Countries (MPCs) to the south. All these were sur-
rounded by the “periphery” to which the EU did not establish com-
parable privileged relations. 
 
The classification into different groups still constituted the political 
reality at the turn of the century. However, with the biggest ever 
enlargement approaching, the development of  a special policy to 
govern relations with the future direct neighbours in the east be-
came more and more urgent. However, the  eventually developed 
ENP was not only designed to  encompass the  “new neighbours” 
Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Moldova,  but  the  Southern  neighbours  as 
well.
7 By doing so, the EU had made a significant move to harmo-
nise its policies towards the east and the south by the establishment 
of the ENP framework, without – yet – touching on the existing fi-
nancial  instruments  MEDA  and  TACIS,  although  some  TACIS-
beneficiaries like the South Caucasus and the Central Asian CIS-
countries were not included in the ENP. As for the Mediterranean, 
the acceding countries Malta and Cyprus as well as Turkey, having 
been  granted  candidate  status  in  1999,  were  not  included  on  the 
partner side of the scheme, because all three of them had reached a 
higher level of affiliation to the EU than the ENP could possibly of-
fer  since  they  no  longer  only  concerned  foreign  policy  strictly 
speaking. 
 
With the enlargement from 15 to 27 members in May 2004 and 
January  2007,  political  geography  changed  once  more.  Only  the 
Western Balkans and Turkey remain between the EU and the “new 
neighbours”, all – at least potential – candidates, and possibly to be 
seen on the EU-side of the equation in the short- to medium-term. 
In  addition,  a  final  distinction  was  made  between  the  remaining 
                                                 
7 In more detail see Comelli 2004: 98-101. Relations with Russia remained on a 
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TACIS-beneficiaries that could become future neighbours and those 
that would even remain peripheral with all of the potential candi-
dates joining the EU. The three South Caucasus states, considered 
peripheral in the beginning of the ENP (Coppieters 2003: 164-168), 
were officially transferred to the ENP in June 2004, due to their 
strategic importance and their relevance for European access to en-
ergy resources. On the other hand, assistance for Mongolia was no 
longer provided via TACIS but via the Union’s instrument to assist 
Asian and Latin American countries. This implied that Mongolia 
was degraded from a privileged relationship to the EU back to de-
velopment co-operation. The same holds true for the Central Asian 
CIS-countries  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. In 2007 the instruments TACIS and MEDA have 
been merged into the European Neighbourhood and Partnership In-
strument (ENPI) and the TACIS-beneficiaries not participating in 
the ENP are transferred to the instrument for development coopera-
tion and economic cooperation.
8 Accordingly, the privileged rela-
tionship between the EU and the Central Asian CIS-countries has 
come to an end. 
 
With these geographic specifications the ENP-countries now form a 
clearly  defined  ring  around  the  EU.  The  vague  concept  of 
neighbourhood  has  thereby  been  reduced  to  the  neighbourhood 
strictly speaking – especially by revising the extension to Central 
Asia. The ring does not only surround the enlarged EU of 2004 and 
2007 but all current candidates as well. By doing so, it effectively 
seems to pre-decide on the ins and outs, i.e. the Union’s finalité 
géographique.
9 In  the  current  situation,  in  which  the  geographic 
consolidation  of  the  ring  coincides  with  the  EU’s  crisis  and  the 
spreading enlargement fatigue, the ENP seems to be the natural ve-
hicle to transfer practical aspects of enlargement policy in order not 
to give up some of the EU’s most efficient tools. Accordingly, the 
ENP – by the incorporation of a certain set of countries and the ex-
clusion of others – is not just forming an arbitrary circle of countries, 
but has been assigned certain functions. 
 
                                                 
8 See for the new classification and establishment of instruments COM(2004) 626 
final. 
9 See for a similar assessment Tocci 2005: 28. 16  European Political Economy Review  
   
From a European perspective, the ENP can indeed serve as premier 
demarcation of the Union’s outer borders. In a certain sense, this 
implies a “hegemonic strategy” (Masala 2006: 130) because it cre-
ates a semi-periphery, or privileged buffer, between the EU and the 
“periphery”:
10 Besides geographically forming a ring around the EU, 
ENP-countries are socio-economically located between the EU and 
the “periphery”. Their GNI/capita is almost equal to the GNI/capita 
of  (potential)  candidates.  With  their  joining  the  EU,  the  ENP-
countries will remain the only group – apart from Russia – socio-
economically  located  between  the  EU  and  the  “periphery” 
(Marchetti 2006: 19). This might help to at least slow down migra-
tory movements from abroad, a perspective the EU is probably not 
very inclined to give up easily. This aspect also clearly shows in 
European discussions on plans to establish refugee camps on the 
soil of ENP-countries,
11 a sort of policy externalisation that strongly 
hints at the ENP’s buffering logic. 
 
 
4.  Responding  to  Partners’  Demands  –  Chances  for 
Neighbours? 
 
Despite its intrinsic logic, the ENP does not necessarily imply a 
mere walling off of the EU. Due to increased interdependencies in 
international relations the EU can only succeed in assigning a semi-
periphery role to neighbours by offering them substantial develop-
ment  perspectives,  thereby  creating  potential  for  a  true  win-win-
game. Accordingly, the Union’s policy towards its neighbours com-
bines excluding and including elements. The enlargement fatigue – 
aggravated by the ratification crisis – brings additional attention to 
the “ring of friends” around the EU and its future members. Since 
enlargement policy can no longer serve as the Union’s first foreign 
policy choice in its vicinity, the EU tries to transfer some of its re-
form-prompting  and  stabilising  tools  to  other  policies.  The  ENP 
seems to be the natural framework to take over this task by further 
attaching partners to the EU, even without a membership perspec-
tive. 
                                                 
10 Del Sarto, Schumacher 2005: 26f also identify a „buffering logic“ and a „cen-
tre-periphery approach“ in the ENP. 
11 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 December 2005: 5. Marchetti: Consolidation in Times of Crisis  17 
As  a  consequence,  the  ENP,  having  been  conceptualized  in  DG 
Enlargement and only been transferred to foreign policy at a later 
stage (Del Sarto, Schumacher 2005: 11), displays some central fea-
tures of enlargement policy. Accordingly, it is also conceptualised 
along the logic of conditionality: Incentives are granted under cer-
tain conditions, after meeting agreed targets.
12 However, the ulti-
mate goal – “everything but membership” – is particularly less at-
tractive to many eastern partners than the prospect of future mem-
bership.
13 For MPCs, however, this connection is less problematic 
as their prospects for membership in the EU are just as low as their 
official ambitions in this respect. But with a constant decrease in the 
number of candidates, the competition between the EU’s enlarge-
ment policy and its neighbourhood policy is losing its bite – in fa-
vour of neighbourhood policy. Since enlargement policy seems to 
phase out, neighbourhood policy has the chance to emancipate and 
to detach from the domination of enlargement policy. Hence, it has 
the potential to become the Union’s number one foreign policy tool 
in its neighbourhood – after enlargement policy has been in this po-
sition for the past 15 years. 
 
In order to especially keep eastern partners on track, the EU has 
been  prompted  to  significantly  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
ENP. As the ENP constitutes one framework for the Union’s cur-
rent  “neighbourhood  schemes”,  the  improvement  will  not  only 
profit the east but also the south. This enhancement is clearly high-
lighted by the increase in status as well as of incentives:
14 
 
1. The legal foundation envisaged for the ENP is more exclusive 
than  for  its  predecessors.  The  Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership  is 
based on Title V TEU (CFSP) and particularly on Art. 133 TEC 
(trade and tariffs), Art. 310 TEC (Association Agreements), and Art. 
308 TEC (MEDA). Analogously, relations with Russia and coun-
tries formerly part of the Soviet Union are governed by Title V TEU 
as well and particularly by Art. 133 TEC, Art. 300 TEC (Partner-
ship and Co-operation Agreements), and Art. 308 TEC (TACIS). 
                                                 
12 Cf. especially COM(2003) 104 final (Wider Europe), p. 16. 
13 In a positive sense, this has at least put an end to the „open-endedness“ of the 
ENP for the time being. This might contribute to its further consolidation as well. 
14 For additional proposals to boost the ENP see Lippert 2006. 18  European Political Economy Review  
   
Most TEC articles referred to also constitute the foundation for the 
EU’s development policy, that is particularly based on Art. 177-181 
TEC, as well as Art. 133 TEC (Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
and Co-operation Agreements), Art. 310 TEC (Cotonou and Asso-
ciation Agreements), and Art. 308 TEC (ALA). In the Constitution 
for Europe (CEU), however, the neighbouring states have been ele-
vated to a higher level in comparison to other third countries: The 
“Union and its neighbours” are exclusively dealt with in Art. I-57 
CEU.  Until  now,  there  has  been  no  particular  mention  of  ENP-
countries within the Treaties. The fact that this is envisioned in the 
constitutional  treaty  of  2005  provides  strong  evidence  that 
neighbours are now considered particularly relevant. 
 
2. The special commitment to neighbours manifests itself in newly 
introduced denominations. The official title of the Commissioner 
for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has been changed 
to “Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbour-
hood Policy”, thereby attributing particular attention to neighbours. 
 
3. One of the major concrete incentives is the significant rise in 
funds  made  available  to  assist  partners.  The  TACIS  and  MEDA 
programmes combined had a volume of approximately 8.5 billion € 
in the period 2000-2006. For the ENPI, almost 11.2 billion € are 
foreseen for 2007-2013.
15 
 
4. Development perspectives of the ENP go well beyond the pros-
pects so far formulated in Association Agreements or Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements. The Union now does not only offer 
preferential trade or participation in a customs union, but also “the 
prospect of a stake in its Internal Market and of further economic 
integration.”
16 The Action Plans substantiate this even more by en-
visaging to move “beyond co-operation to a significant degree of in-
tegration, including [...] a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the 
possibility  [...]  to  participate  progressively  in  key  aspects  of  EU 
                                                 
15 Art. 29, Regulation (EC) 1638/2006. In addition, TACIS beneficiaries Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan then will be covered 
by the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument. 
16 The phrase cited is included in all 12 Country Reports so far published, p. 3; 
see as well COM(2003) 104 final (Wider Europe), p. 10 and COM(2004) 373 fi-
nal (ENP Strategy Paper), p. 5. Marchetti: Consolidation in Times of Crisis  19 
policies and programmes.”
17 As the EU at present is not officially 
proposing  EU-membership  to  neighbours,  these  perspectives  and 
the increase in funds made available constitute the strongest incen-
tives so far.
18 
 
Since eastern and southern partners are now pooled in one frame-
work, incentives have also been increased for MPCs. Provided that 
the ENP can develop or keep up a certain momentum in the east as 
alternative to enlargement policy, the Mediterranean might be able 
to adhere to the accelerated momentum and profit from the new op-
portunities offered. Although based on increased differentiation, the 
EU intends to establish a quite coherent framework. Otherwise, the 
merger of MEDA and TACIS into the ENPI would not have been 
necessary. In addition, the ENP-process has largely been conducted 
simultaneously with eastern as well as with southern partners since 
its inauguration. Country Reports or Action Plans have often been 
published  simultaneously.  The  perspective  of  Neighbourhood 
Agreements
19 to replace the older Association Agreements or Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreements as a new, common basis also 
highlights the EU’s determination to harmonise its policy towards 
its neighbours from the Maghreb to Belarus. 
 
Table 1: State of relations of the EU with ENP countries 
 
Contractual basis  Country 
type  agreed  in force 
Country Re-
port 
Action 
Plan 
Algeria  AA  12/2001  03/2005  -  - 
Armenia  PCA  04/1996  07/1999  03/2005  11/2006 
Azerbaijan  PCA  04/1996  07/1999  03/2005  11/2006 
Belarus  PCA  03/1995  -  -  11/2006 
Egypt  AA  06/2001  06/2004  03/2005  - 
Georgia  PCA  04/1996  07/1999  03/2005  - 
                                                 
17 The phrase can be found in all 10 Action Plans so far adopted, p. 2; Georgia is 
even granted the perspective of a gradual extension of the four freedoms, even 
though the Union has avoided to include this perspective in any ENP-document 
ever since the Wider Europe communication. 
18 Dannreuther 2006: 190f points out that the perspective to grant the four free-
doms – as given in COM(2003) 104 final (Wider Europe), p. 10 – has not been 
maintained; evidently because this could have implied a pre-enlargement strategy 
within ENP. 
19 COM(2004) 373 final (ENP Strategy Paper), p. 5. 20  European Political Economy Review  
   
Israel  AA  11/1995  06/2000  05/2004  04/2005 
Jordan  AA  11/1997  05/2002  05/2004  06/2005 
Lebanon  AA  06/2002  03/2003*  03/2005  - 
Libya  -  -  -  -  - 
Moldova  PCA  11/1994  07/1998  05/2004  02/2005 
Morocco  AA  02/1996  03/2000  05/2004  07/2005 
Palestinian 
Authority 
AA*  02/1997*  07/1997*  05/2004  05/2005 
Syria  AA  10/2004  -  -  - 
Tunisia  AA  07/1995  03/1998  05/2004  07/2005 
Ukraine  PCA  06/1994  03/1998  05/2004  02/2005 
Legend:  AA  -  Association  Agreement;  PCA  -  Partnership  and  Co-operation 
Agreement; * Interim Agreement. 
Data retrieved from: http://europa.eu. 
 
On the other hand, the ENP assembles a set of very heterogeneous 
countries – even the MPCs alone cannot be regarded as a homoge-
neous entity (Pace 2005). Considering individual countries’ devel-
opment perspectives, Schmid (2006: 123f.) stresses the danger, that 
MPCs  might  be  de-coupled,  because  eastern  partners  might  well 
constitute  a  very  strong  competition,  attract  the  vast  majority  of 
funds and leave not more but less to MPCs. However, so far the EU 
has strictly indicated the funds to be allocated to neighbours and the 
“fiches on partners”
20 released in December 2006 show that glob-
ally MPCs will not lose. Nonetheless, the increase for the east will 
be more substantial. On the other hand, European Investment Bank 
lending, totalling €12.4 billion for ENPI-countries, will largely go 
to MPCs with €8.7 billion earmarked for the Mediterranean alone.
21 
Another indication for the EU’s determination to prevent any severe 
de-coupling within the neighbourhood lies in the maintenance of the 
regional elements of the EMP within the dominantly bilateral ENP 
framework. 
 
Since the economic and structural position of MPCs makes it unre-
alistic  for  them  to  join  the  internal  market  in  the  near  future 
(Schmid 2006: 122) they should rather regard the EU’s offer as a 
perspective  and the potential accomplishment by  eastern partners 
                                                 
20 See the “Fiches on Partners” at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/enp-country-
2006_en.pdf. 
21 Cf. “Council agrees on renewed mandate for external lending by the European 
Investment Bank”, 15787/06 (Press 339), Brussels, 28 November 2006. Marchetti: Consolidation in Times of Crisis  21 
might at least induce new momentum into the building of the Medi-
terranean free trade area, a project that has not yet come close to re-
alisation.  Certainly,  no  partner  should  be  overcharged,  but  the 
ENP’s overall development can surely highlight the possibilities of 
how  far  countries  can  go  with  this  policy.  The  EMP  as  unique 
framework  for  Mediterranean  partners  did  not  get  the  chance  to 
fully display its potential. Now people can better evaluate the per-
formances of different countries in the new framework. Achievers 
will be recognised and non-achievers will have to increasingly ex-
plain themselves abroad and at home. What holds true for the EU 
therefore  holds  true  for  neighbours  as  well:  Increased  challenges 
can be the source for further development. 
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